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Émilie Aussant 
 
Sanskrit grammarians  
and the ‘speaking subjectivity’1 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The present study bears on the speaking subjectivity,2 an expression which de-
notes, in Western Human Sciences, various notions (the physical producer of 
the utterance, the subject who is in charge of the act of speech, the source of 
the point of view expressed in the utterance, the reference point of deictics, the 
native speaker, the speech community, etc.). It is a fundamental question for 
several trends in Western Linguistics which, within the field of technical 
Sanskrit literature on language — grammar (vyākaraṇa), exegesis (mīmāṃsā) 
and dialectic (nyāya) — has been selectively treated by Indologists (to my 
knowledge, only the notion of vivakṣā “intention to speak” was studied in 
depth).3  
My approach can be described as follows. Vyākaraṇa, the ancient Sanskrit 
grammatical tradition, is traditionally described as one of the six Vedic auxil-
iary sciences (vedāṅga) which were developed in ancient Brahmanical India to 
preserve the sacred texts of the Veda4 and to guarantee the correctness of the 
                                              
1) This is the publication of two lectures given on the occasion of the 12th International Confer-
ence on the History of Language Sciences (ICHoLS), held in 2011 in St. Petersburg for the first 
and on the occasion of the 7e Journée Monde Indien, held in 2012 in Paris for the second. 
2) I borrow the expression from Charaudeau and Maingueneau (2002: 224). 
3) See §3, 2 for references. Jamison’s study The Rig Veda between two worlds provides valuable 
information on the speaking subjectivity’s manifestations within Rigvedic hymns, even if it is 
more a study devoted to poetic and linguistic facts than to the native analysis of these very 
facts.  
4) Such is the original aim of Phonetics (śikṣā), Metrics (chandas), Etymology (nirukta) and 
Grammar (vyākaraṇa). Despite of its Vedic auxiliary status, Grammar broke free from the reli-
gious sphere; it quickly developed in an autonomous way, focusing on language and not only 
(or preferably) on the Vedic texts.  
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ritual practices.5 It is therefore intended first for members of the priestly (and 
elite) class, the brahmins.6 In such a framework, where the reflection on lan-
guage is originally and inextricably linked to the oral transmission of sacred 
texts, is there any space, in Vyākaraṇic texts, for the users of the language or, 
broadly speaking, for the speaking subjectivity? If so, what kind of space? This 
paper is a tentative answer to these questions: starting from the grammatical 
terminology, I give a panorama of the speaking subjectivity manifestations 
according to Sanskrit grammatical texts, from the Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini to the 
Paramalaghumañjūṣā of Nāgeśa.7 
 
 
2. The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini 
Pāṇini’s grammar — the Aṣṭādhyāyī (A), 5th cent. B.C. — describes an early 
Indo-Aryan linguistic variety which is located at a transitional period between 
— what Western scholars call — late Vedic Sanskrit and classical Sanskrit. 
This grammatical treatise, which is made up of nearly four thousand statements 
called sūtra, describes Sanskrit by means of a derivational system: correct sen-
tences “are derived from posited abstract utterances which Pāṇini arrives at by 
letting affixes (pratyaya) be introduced to bases under meaning conditions and 
co-occurrence conditions” (Cardona 1997: 1). This derivational procedure, 
which goes from the more to the less general, is like a sequence of algorithmic 
instructions; but it is a non-deterministic algorithm, that is to say, it implies 
choices.8 And it is there, at the very level of these choices, that the speaker’s 
subjectivity makes its entrance onto the grammatical stage.  
The choices of the speaking subject — embodied in the grammar user — 
take place at various stages: before, during and after the derivation. Before the 
derivation are the lexical options. To denote rice, for example, the speaker/ 
grammar user may choose the word odana, taṇḍula, pāyasa or peyā. This kind 
of option is not mentioned in Pāṇini’s grammar; the choice is supposed to have 
been made before the beginning of the derivation. During the derivation, there 
are syntactico-semantical options such as choosing between a nominal or a ver-
                                              
5) Such is the aim of Astronomy (jyotiṣa) and Ritual (kalpa). 
6) Members of the three highest classes are theoretically allowed to perform a sacrifice (and then 
to pronounce some Vedic verses). Therefore, they are also likely to be concerned by the gram-
matical knowledge. 
7) The list of Indian authors and Sanskrit texts mentioned in the paper is given in a table after the 
conclusion. 
8) Some consider that this is only one of the two ways of using the A. According to them, the A 
was probably used not only as a generative procedure of linguistic data (a top-down grammati-
cal model), but also as an analytical procedure of already produced linguistic data (a bottom-up 
grammatical model). This issue, regardless its importance for the history of linguistic thought 
in Ancient India, is beyond my scope here. 
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bal sentence, choosing — in the case of a verbal sentence — between the active 
or the passive voice,9 choosing semantic roles (agent, patient, instrument, re-
cipient), 10  choosing the person, number and time for a verb, choosing the 
number and gender for a noun, etc. This kind of option is simply enabled by 
the system. Take for example the following case: a man is cooking rice. To 
describe the situation, the A enables different sentences to be made, among 
which an active verbal sentence: sa odanaṃ pacati “he cooks rice” and a 
nominal sentence: sa odanasya paktā “he is [the] rice cooker”. According to 
Pāṇini, the syntactic and semantic relation is the same in both sentences; the 
structural differences are only due to the speaker/grammar user’s choices. The 
starting point, in both cases, is the verbal root pac- “to cook”; if the speaker/ 
grammar user wants to focus on the agent, he will start the derivation of the 
sentence sa odanasya paktā by applying the sūtra A 3.4.67 kartari kṛt // “[The] 
kṛt [suffix is added to the verbal root < A 3.1.91] to denote the agent” to the 
root pac-; if he wants to use a verbal sentence, he will apply a succession of 
sūtras (A 3.4.69, A 3.4.77–78, A 3.2.123 and A 1.3.14 or A 1.3.78) to the 
said root, which will enable him to select the desired affixes of person, time, 
and so on. In such cases, the option is only indicated by the applicability of the 
rules to the same form. Choices occurring after the derivation can be described 
as follows: when a word has been derived according to one method, another 
form of the word — derived by a different method — may be introduced as an 
alternative. In such cases the optional characteristic is described with great 
care. It is most frequently indicated by the use of the disjunctive particles vā, 
vibhāṣā and anyatarasyām,11 as one can observe in the following examples: 
 
— A 2.3.71 kṛtyānāṃ kartari vā // “[The genitive ending < A 2.3.50 is] optionally 
[used] to denote the agent of the gerundive”  bhavataḥ kaṭaḥ kartavyaḥ “you 
have to make a mat” (the other possibility is to use the instrumental (cf. A 
2.3.18)  bhavatā kaṭaḥ kartavyaḥ); 
— A 3.1.120 vibhāṣā kṛ-vṛṣoḥ // “[The gerundive suffix kyap12 < A 3.1.106 is] 
optionally [used] after kṛ- “to do” and vṛṣ- “to rain”  kṛtya “to be done”, 
vṛṣya “to be rained upon” (the other possibility is to use the gerundive suffix 
ṇyat (cf. A 3.1.124)  kārya, varṣya); 
                                              
 9) For the roots accepting both. 
10) For example, if the speaker/grammar user wants to describe a situation where a man is cutting 
a tree with an axe, he has to choose between the presentation of the axe as the agent (use of the 
nominative case) or as the instrument (use of the instrumental case). See Cardona (1974, 1975) 
and Scharf (2002). 
11) According to Paul Kiparsky (1979: 1), vā means “or rather, usually, preferably”, vibhāṣā 
means “or rather not, rarely, preferably not, marginally” and anyatarasyām means “either way, 
sometimes, optionally, alternatively”. Other terms used to denote (non-conditioned) options are 
ubhayathā, paryāyeṇa, bahulam, vibhāṣita. They are not frequently used (cf. Kiparsky 1979: 
205–208). 
12) Bold letters are metalinguistic markers (anubandha). 
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— A 3.1.122 amāvasyad anyatarasyām // “[The irregular form] amāvasyat [is] 
optionally [used]”  amāvasyā “new-moon day” (the other possibility is to use 
the regular form amāvāsyā (cf. A 3.1.124)). 
 
Another way to indicate a post-derivation option is by the use of names refer-
ring to a place, indicating that the alternative form is geographically condi-
tioned, as in A 6.3.32 mātara-pitarāv udīcām // “[The compound] mātara-
pitarau “mother and father” [is used] among the northerners” (for non-
northerner speakers the compound is mātā-pitarau), or of ethnonyms as in A 
4.2.76 strīṣu sauvīra-sālva-prākṣu // “[The suffix añ is used to designate place 
names < A 4.2.71] in the feminine gender, [the place being in the region] of 
the Sauvīras, of the Sālvas or in the eastern region” (obtained forms: Dāttāmi-
trī for the Sauvīras, Vaidhūmāgnī for the Sālvas, Kākandī in the East; the use 
of the suffix añ, in these linguistic communities, causes the acute accentuation 
on the first syllable; in other communities, another suffix is used which bears 
the accent). In such a case, the alternative is introduced as culturally conditio-
ned. The use of names of grammarians or scholars13 also indicates post-deriva-
tion options, as in A 6.1.127 ikaḥ_asavarṇe śākalyasya hrasvaś ca // “Ac-
cording to Ṣākalya, [the vowels] i, u, ṛ, ḷ, [keep their original form] before a 
non-homogeneous [vowel] and, [if the original is long] the short is substituted 
to it” (dadhi + atra = dadhi atra; according to A 6.1.77 iko yaṇ aci //, dadhi 
+ atra = dadhy atra).  
Some words are also introduced in the A as resulting from a choice made 
by the speech community, in other words, a conventional choice. In this case, 
I use the word choice in the sense of “tacit agreement”. This “conventional 
choice” label is used, in the A, for introducing linguistic forms which possess 
a specific meaning and which are lexicalized (Kiparsky 1979: 124) — whether 
they are derivable or not —.14 For example, the sūtra A 4.3.27 saṃjñāyāṃ 
śarado vuñ “vuñ (i.e. the suffix -aka) [is used] after śarat “autumn” [to signi-
fy “born at that time” < A 4.3.25, the obtained form] being a proper name” 
introduces the form śāradaka which literally means “born in Autumn” and 
which denotes a kind of plant; śāradaka has a place in the A only because it 
possesses a specific meaning, otherwise it would have been rejected, the regu-
lar form being śārada. The term saṃjñā, which literally means “agreement, 
common knowledge”, is the main indicator of such conventions (or opaque 
terms).15 
                                              
13) These names are: Āpiṣali (A 6.1.92), Bhāradjāva (A 7.2.63), Cākravarmaṇa (A 6.1.130), Gā-
lava (A 6.3.61, A 7.1.74, A 7.3.99, A 8.4.67), Gārgya (A 7.3.99, A 8.4.67), Kāśyapa (A 
8.4.67), Śākalya (A 1.1.16, A 6.1.127, A 8.3.19, A 8.4.51), Senaka (A 5.4.112) and Sphoṭā-
yana (A 6.1.123). Note that the term ācārya “teacher” is also used twice (A 7.3.49, A 8.4.52). 
14) That is: technical terms, proper names, terms whose denotation bears any relation to the etymo-
logical meaning, terms extracted from a particular context.  
15) One remark on the use of the term ācikhyāsāyām “when there is desire to express” used in A 
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To sum up briefly: the speaking subject — embodied in the grammar user 
— is constantly implied within the Aṣṭādhyāyī, but is neither expressed nor 
named. The existence of choices — whether they are indicated or not — is his 
only manifestation. The speaking subject appears as someone freely choosing 
such and such a lexical item, such and such a syntactic structure — either in 
the stock of his linguistic aptitudes or in the glossaries and the grammar —, the 
only constraint apparently being what he wants to say. One will also note that 
the linguistic levels subject to the speaker’s choices are phonetics (sandhi), 
prosody, verbal and nominal morphology (declensions, derivatives, com-
pounds, gender) and syntactic-semantics.  
 
 
3. The Vārttikas of Kātyāyana and the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali 
The earliest extensive discussion of Pāṇini’s rules which has come down to us 
is contained in the Vārttikas (V) of Kātyāyana (3rd cent. B.C.), which them-
selves are known only as quoted and commented on in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya 
(M, 2nd cent. B.C.). Kātyāyana and Patañjali discuss the validity of various 
rules, their formulation and their relation to other rules. Discussing the Pāṇi-
nian sūtras is the occasion, for both grammarians, to develop some thoughts 
about different language facts. Human manifestations in language are one of 
them. One can distinguish between not less than five categories of terms denot-
ing these: 
 
1) The category which was made, in the A, of numerous terms referring to 
different kinds of variability, is now reduced to the particle vā “or” only, 
which indicates option in a very general way. 
2) A second category is made up of terms denoting the speaker’s intention, 
either derived from a word signifying “wish” or from a desiderative form of a 
root.16 One finds in this category: 
                                              
2.4.21 upajñā-upakramaṃ tad-ādy-ācikhyāsāyām // “[A determinative compound < A 2.4.19] 
ending in upajñā “invention” or upakrama “initiative” [is neuter in gender < A 2.4.17] when 
there is desire to express the beginning [of the said invention or initiative]”. The Kāśikāvṛtti 
(KV) paraphrases ācikhyāsāyām saying ākhyātum icchā “the desire (icchā) to express 
(ākhyātum)”. In my opinion, the information given by ācikhyāsāyām can be compared to 
several others which are described by Indian commentators as meaning conditions and which 
are indicated, in the Pāṇinian sūtras, either by the locative case, as in A 3.2.49 āśiṣi hanaḥ // 
“[The suffix ḍa < A 3.2.48, when co-occurring with a nominal stem functioning as its object 
< A 3.2.1 is used] after han- “to kill” to denote benediction”, or by the accusative case, as in 
A 3.1.102 vahyaṃ karaṇam // “[The irregular form] vahyaṃ [is used to denote] an 
instrument”, or by the word arthe, as in A 2.1.9 sup pratinā mātrā-arthe // “An inflected 
[word combined] with prati [forms an indeclinable compound < A 2.1.6] to denote a small 
quantity”. According to this view, tad-ādy-ācikhyāsāyām simply amounts to “to denote the 
beginning [of the said invention or initiative]”. 
16) One also finds the use of abhiprāya “intention”, see for example M on V 15 on A 3.1.26 
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— the adverb yatheṣṭam, (i.e. yathā-iṣṭam, iṣṭam is derived from the root iṣ- 
“to wish, to desire”), as well as its synonym kāmam (derived from the root 
kam- “to desire, to love”)17 which means “according to one’s wish, at will”.18 
The term is used in relation to free word order, as in the following passage:19  
sub-alopo vyavadhānaṃ yatheṣṭam anyatareṇa_abhisaṃbandhaḥ svaraḥ iti // [...] 
yatheṣṭam anyatareṇa_abhisaṃbandho bhavati vākye / rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ puruṣo 
rājña iti / samāse na bhavati / rāja-puruṣa iti // (M on V 1 on A 2.1.1, vol. I, 362)  
Non-disappearance of case-ending, intervention [by another word], connection of 
[one word] with another according to one’s wish, accent (these are the characteris-
tic features of words in a non-compound word-group). [...] The connection of [one 
word] with another according to one’s wish occurs in a sentence (i.e. a non-com-
pound word-group). [Example:] rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ (“king’s man”), puruṣo rājñaḥ 
(“man of a king”). In a compound, it does not occur. [Example:] rāja-puruṣaḥ 
(“king-man”).20 
Kaiyaṭa, in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (Pradīpa – P – 11th cent.) 
adds: 
yatheṣṭam iti / vākye_aniyata-paurvāparyeṇa padānāṃ prayogaḥ samāse tu niyata-
paurvāparyaḥ / sa ca_artha-abheda-nibandhanaḥ / yathā karka iti prayoktavye 
rkaka iti na prayujyate /  (P on M on V 1 on A 2.1.1, vol. III, 19)  
yatheṣṭam — In a sentence (i.e. a non-compound word-group), words are used 
without a determinate order, but in a compound, order is determinate. This comes 
from [the fact that a compound has] a single meaning. Just as, when one should 
use the k-a-r-k-a [sequence, which means “white”], one does not use the r-k-a-k-a 
[sequence, which is meaningless]. 
Another occurrence of the term yatheṣṭam (V 2 and M on A 1.1.72, vol. I, 
183) concerns the qualifier/qualified relation (viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-yoga). The 
classical example given by Indian grammarians to illustrate this point — which 
is clearly a semantic one — is the following: in the sequence kṛṣṇo gauḥ “the 
                                              
(topic: morphology). The term iṣṭa “desired” is often used (see, among others, M on V 2 on A 
1.1.50 and M on V 7 on A 1.4.2) but, in all of its occurrences, it denotes a correct linguistic 
form which is aimed at or expected. A detailed analysis of the term within the grammatical 
sphere is to be carried out.  
17) E.g. kāmam atidiśyatāṃ vā sac ca_asat ca_api na_iha bhāraḥ_asti / kalpyo hi vākya-śeṣo 
vākyaṃ vaktary adhīnaṃ hi // (M quoting a ślokavārttika on V 6 on A 1.1.57, vol. I, 147) 
“The application or the non application [of a grammatical operation to a linguistic form] may 
be transferred at will. Here (in the case of A 1.1.57) we need not bother. Because a suitable 
supplement of a statement can [always] be assumed, for [the meaning of a statement] depends 
on the speaker.” I follow the translation given by Joshi and Roodbergen (1990: 233). 
18) There are also two occurrences of the adjective yadṛcchā (i.e. yad-icchā, icchā is derived from 
the root iṣ- “to wish, to desire”), which means “according to the wish of the one [who speaks]”. 
The context is the arbitrary use of names (cf. Aussant 2009: 55–68). 
19) Other occurrence: M on V 1 on A 1.1.58. 
20) I follow the translation given by Joshi (1968: 56). 
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cow is black”, one can equally say that the cowness qualifies the black colour 
and that the black colour qualifies the cowness. The final understanding de-
pends on the speaker’s intention alone. 
The last occurrence of the term concerns the derivation of denominals, that 
is to say morphology: 
vā nāma-dhātūnām (V4) // vā nāma-dhātūnāṃ tṛtīyasya dve bhavata iti vakta-
vyam / aśvīyiyiṣati / aśiśvīyiṣati // apara āha / yatheṣṭaṃ vā / yatheṣṭaṃ vā nāma-
dhātūnām iti / puputrīyiṣati / putitrīyiṣati / putrīyiyiṣati //   
 (V 4 and M on A 6.1.3, vol. III, 8)  
(V4) [The reduplication of the third syllable] is optional for denominals. One must 
say: the reduplication of the third syllable is optional for denominals. [Examples:] 
aśvīyiyiṣati [and] aśiśvīyiṣati (desideratives of the denominal verb aśvīyati “to de-
sire horses” derived from aśva “horse”). Others say: or [the reduplication of the 
third syllable for denominals] is according to one’s wish. Or, [the reduplication of 
the third syllable for] denominals is according to one’s wish. [Examples:] puputrī-
yiṣati, putitrīyiṣati [and] putrīyiyiṣati (desideratives of the denominal verb putrīya 
“to wish for a son” derived from putra “son”).  
One notes that, here, yatheṣṭaṃ seems to denote an unbridled option, where 
the choice goes beyond the mere alternative. 
— Still in the category denoting the speaker’s intention, one finds the noun 
vivakṣā (and forms like vivakṣāta, vivakṣita, avivakṣita) derived from the de-
siderative form of the root vac- “to say” and which means “the wish to say”. 
This term, usually translated by “speaker’s intention” has been studied in great 
detail by various Western scholars. 21  I will therefore content myself with 
briefly summing up the data. The term is used in the following contexts: the 
qualifier/qualified relation (M on A 1.1.66–67, 2.1.57), the number of nouns 
(M on A 1.2.58, 1.2.59, 1.2.64, 4.1.93), the gender of nouns (M on A 
1.2.64, 1.2.68, 4.1.3, 4.1.92, 6.3.42), the object of words (individual versus 
generic property, M on A 1.2.64), the semantic roles (M on A 1.4.23, 1.4.24, 
2.3.52, 2.3.67, 3.1.87), the verbal voices (M on A 1.3.72), the nominal and 
the verbal sentences (M on A 2.3.50), the verbal expression of time (M on A 
3.2.110, 3.2.120, 3.3.132).22 The notion of vivakṣā was also the occasion, for 
Patañjali, to make a distinction between two kinds of “wish to say”. While 
                                              
21) Renou (1940), Van Nooten (1983), Radicchi (1993), Scharf (1995, 2002). 
22) The use of the term iti (quotative marker, see Aussant 2005), in the A, is sometimes interpreted 
as a means of referring to the usual intention (vivakṣā) with which a linguistic form is used in 
the current usage. In such cases, iti should be understood as signifying “this linguistic form is 
taken from current usage, with the intention it usually has there”. See, among others, A 2.2.27 
and 4.2.21, as well as the KV on those sūtras. 
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commenting on the sūtra A 5.1.16, he indeed distinguishes the prāyoktrī vivak-
ṣā from the laukikī vivakṣā:23 
vivakṣā ca dvayī / asty eva prāyoktrī vivakṣā_asti laukikī // prāyoktrī vivakṣā / 
prayoktā hi mṛdvyā snigdhayā ślakṣṇayā jihvayā mṛdūn snigdhāñ ślakṣṇāñ śabdān 
prayuṅkte / laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya saṃpratyayaḥ / prāya iti loko vyapa-
diśyate /  (M on A 5.1.16, vol. II, 342–343) 
The wish to say is of two [kinds]: there is the wish to say of the [language] user 
and the wish to say of mundane [usage]. The wish to say of the [language] user: 
the [language] user indeed, by means of a soft, unctuous, smooth tongue, uses 
soft, unctuous, smooth words. The wish to say of the mundane [usage]: this is 
where there is general agreement. “general agreement” [means] current [usage]. 
It seems here that the distinction lies more between the individual mispronun-
ciation — as the words mṛdu and jihvā would suggest —24 and the current 
correct use of language than between the individual speech activity (the Saus-
surian “parole” or the Chomskyan “performance”) and the linguistic system 
(the Saussurian “langue” or the Chomskyan “competence”). This at least is the 
interpretation given by Kaiyaṭa: 
mṛdūn iti / apabhraṃśān ity arthaḥ / tasmāt prayoktṛ-vivakṣā na_āśriyate, prayok-
tuḥ svātantryān niyama-abhāvāt / prāyasya_iti / samagra-kalpasya_ity arthaḥ /   
 (P on M on A 5.1.16, vol. IV, 284) 
mṛdūn — the meaning is “corrupt [words]”. That is why there is no reference 
[here] to the [language] user’s wish to express [himself about a, b, c, etc.], given 
his unlimited freedom (i.e. the speaker is free to say what he chooses). prāyasya 
— the meaning is “all of the right [speech practices]”.  
3) The agent noun prayoktṛ “[language] user” we have just met with consti-
tutes, with the agent noun vaktṛ, the category made up of terms denoting the 
speaker. The noun prayoktṛ occurs in various contexts (M on A 1.1.44, 
1.2.51, 3.2.111, 8.1.4), perhaps more when the topic under discussion per-
tains to semantics. The agent noun vaktṛ is mainly used to denote the speaker 
as a speech sounds pronouncer — i.e. it lays stress on the phonatory produc-
tion (cf. M Paspaśā, M on A 1.1.57, V 5 on A 1.1.70, A 1.2.27, A 1.2.69, A 
1.4.109, A 4.2.3, A 5.3.57). 
 
                                              
23) The reason why Patañjali mentions vivakṣā is the use of iti in the sūtra (cf. the previous foot-
note). 
24) As it appears in the Pradīpa quoted below, mṛdu “soft” designates apabhraṃśa “corrupt 
[words]”. The dialects of Sanskrit, the Prakrits, are often characterised as using “sweet” sounds 
(because of a marked phenomenon of assimilation, the disappearance of a lot of internal con-
sonants, etc.). Abhyankar, in his Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar, notes that mṛdu is the name 
given to the first, third and fifth consonants of the five classes of Sanskrit consonants. The term 
jihvā always denotes, in the grammatical field, the tongue as a phonatory organ. 
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4) The fourth category which is by far the richest, brings together terms de-
noting kinds of speakers. Four terms are used to denote good or authoritative 
speakers:25 
— the noun ācārya (“one who knows or teaches the ācāra (rules)”), which is 
frequently used by Patañjali to refer to grammarians (e.g. V 3 and M on A 
1.1.1), in the continuity of the A (A 7.3.49, A 8.4.52); 
— the noun/adjective ārya (“hospitable, welcoming”), which occurs in two 
contexts (M on A 2.4.10, 6.3.109) where it denotes the Āryans, the Sanskrit 
speakers living in a region called the Ārya-āvarta (one will see an occurrence 
bellow);  
— the noun ṛṣi (“seer, sage, poet”), which denotes ancient partially mythi-
cized sages of the Vedic period whose authority is unquestioned (cf. Deshpan-
de 1998: 9), as it appears in the following passage: 
yarvāṇas-tarvāṇo nāma_rṣayo babhūvuḥ pratyakṣa-dharmāṇaḥ para-apara-jñā 
vidita-veditavyā adhigata-yāthātathyāḥ / te tatra-bhavanto yad vā nas tad vā na iti 
prayoktavye yarvāṇas tarvāṇa iti prayuñjate yājñe punaḥ karmaṇi na_apabhā-
ṣante /  (M, vol. I, 11) 
There were sages (rṣayo) named yarvāṇas-tarvāṇas who perceived the nature of 
things, who knew the far and the near, who knew what could be known [and] who 
had come to realize ultimate reality. These honourable [sages] used yarvāṇas tar-
vāṇaḥ when they should have used yad vā naḥ tad vā naḥ (“whatever [happens] to 
us, [let] that [happens] to us”). But at the time of a ritual act, they did not spoke in 
a corrupt way.26 
— the adjective śiṣṭa (“taught, learned”), which denotes a kind of speaker one 
could compare — contrary to what the etymological meaning of the word 
implies — to what Western linguists call “native speakers”. The following dis-
cussion is found in the M:  
[...] evaṃ tarhi nivāsata ācārataś ca / sa ca_ācāra ārya-āvarta eva / kaḥ punar 
ārya-āvartaḥ / prāg ādarśāt pratyak kālaka-vanād dakṣiṇena himavantam uttareṇa 
pāriyātram / etasminn ārya-nivāse ye brāhmaṇāḥ kumbhī-dhānyā alolupā agṛhya-
māṇa-kāraṇāḥ kiñ cid antareṇa kasyāś cid vidyāyāḥ pāragās tatra-bhavantaḥ 
śiṣṭāḥ // yadi tarhi śiṣṭāḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇaṃ kim aṣṭādhyāyyā kriyate / śiṣṭa-
jñāna-artha-aṣṭādhyāyī / kathaṃ punar aṣṭādhyāyyā śiṣṭāḥ śakyā vijñātum / aṣṭā-
adhyāyīm adhīyānaḥ_anyam paśyaty anadhīyānaṃ ye_atra vihitāḥ śabdās tān pra-
yuñjānam / sa paśyati / nūnam asya daiva-anugrahaḥ sva-bhāvo vā yaḥ_ayaṃ na 
ca_aṣṭādhyāyīm adhīte ye ca_atra vihitāḥ śabdās tāṃś ca prayuṅkte / ayaṃ nūnam 
anyān api jānāti / evam eṣā śiṣṭa-parijñāna-artha-aṣṭādhyāyī //   
 (M on A 6.3.109, vol. III, 174)  
                                              
25) The word āpta is not used (neither in the V, nor in the M) with this meaning. 
26) I follow the translation given by Joshi and Roodbergen (1986: 156–157). 
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[...] [One defines Śiṣṭas] by their place of residence and their way of life. And that 
way of life [is found] only in [the region of] Āryāvarta. — What is this Āryāvarta? 
— It lies to the east of Ādarśa, to the west of Kālakavana, to the south of Hima-
vant, and to the north of the Pāriyātra. Those brahmins who live in the land of the 
Āryas, who possess a basketful of grain, who are not greedy, who without any 
motive have attained the highest wisdom in some branch of learning, these are the 
honourable Śiṣṭas. — If the Śiṣṭas are authoritative concerning [the correction of] 
words, then what is the function of [Pāṇini’s] Aṣṭādhyāyī? — The Aṣṭādhyāyī aims 
at helping one recognize these Śiṣṭas. — How the Śiṣṭas can be recognized by 
means of the Aṣṭādhyāyī? — Someone who has studied the Aṣṭādhyāyī observes an-
other person who has not studied [it but] who uses words taught in it. The [student 
of Pāṇini’s grammar] observes: it must be either divine grace or some innate nature 
that this [person] who does not study the Aṣṭādhyāyī uses words taught in it. He 
probably knows even other [correct words which are not taught in the Aṣṭādhyāyī]. 
This way the Aṣṭādhyāyī aims at helping one recognize these Śiṣṭas. 
According to Patañjali then (and probably Kātyāyana), Śiṣṭas, defined by their 
place of residence and their way of life, naturally know correct and incorrect 
words.27 
To close the list of terms denoting kinds of speaker, one must note the use 
of a term referring to bad speakers, that is the noun mleccha which would 
mean “barbarian”28 and which one finds in the following passage:29 
te_asurā helayo helaya iti kurvantaḥ parābabhūvuḥ / tasmād brāhmaṇena na 
mlecchitavai na_apabhāṣitavai / mleccho ha vā eṣa yad apaśabdaḥ / mlecchā mā 
bhūma_ity adhyeyaṃ vyākaraṇam /  (M, vol. I, 8) 
These demons, having said helayo helayaḥ (“O enemies, O enemies”), were de-
feated; that is why a brahmin must not utter barbarisms (mlecchitavai) [that is to 
say] must not speak in a corrupt way (apabhāṣitavai); barbarism, indeed, [is the 
same as] a corrupt word. Not to become barbarians, we should study grammar. 
                                              
27) Bhartṛhari makes different use of the term, as remarks Deshpande (1993: 104–105): “[...] 
while Patañjali is speaking about a real community of ideal speakers residing in the region of 
Āryāvarta, a community of learned Brāhmaṇas, Bhartṛhari has almost mythologized the con-
ception of Śiṣṭa. It has no specific regionality or temporality, but it has a very high degree of 
spirituality. This high degree of spirituality seems to indicate that he is not speaking about any 
contemporary persons, but mythologized great sages of the golden age of Sanskrit grammar.” 
Still, in both cases, the characteristic of Śiṣṭas lies in the fact that they know (naturally accord-
ing to Patañjali, thanks to mystical powers according to Bhartṛhari) which words are correct 
and which words are not. 
28) Leemans and Hansman (quoted in Driem 2001: 1036) give another analysis for mleccha: the 
term would be connected — like Pāli milakkha — to meluḫḫa, which is found in cuneiform 
Mesopotamian documents (cf. Parpola 1994: 13–14, 170), probably as a Harappean ethnonym. 
29) Patañjali also uses terms such as apa-śabda “irregular form” (the prefix apa- indicates absence 
or, as here, inferiority), apa-bhraṃśa “corrupt form” (derived from braṃś- “to deviate”) and 
mleccha(śabda) “barbarism”. 
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All these terms then distinguish kinds of speaker according to their authorita-
tiveness — or lack of authoritativeness — regarding speech. As the number of 
terms suggests it, this is a very important matter for Indian grammarians 
whose first task is to preserve Sanskrit or, according to their own point of 
view, correct language. 
 
5) The fifth and last category brings together terms referring to mundane or 
current use of language, that is to say, to the social dimension of speech activi-
ty. One finds here: 
— the noun loka (“open space, place, world”) which denotes the current 
usage of speech. This term, very frequent in the M (138 occurrences), is used 
in contexts where general social conventions regarding language are referred 
to, as for example gender30 and the word-object relation as it appears in the 
following passage: 
kathaṃ punar jñāyate siddhaḥ śabdaḥ_arthaḥ saṃbandhaś ca iti / lokataḥ / yal 
loke_artham artham upādāya śabdān prayuñjate na_eṣāṃ nirvṛttau yatnaṃ 
kurvanti / ye punaḥ kāryā bhāvā nirvṛttau tāvat teṣāṃ yatnaḥ kriyate / tad yathā / 
ghaṭena kāryaṃ kariṣyan kumbha-kāra-kulaṃ gatvā_āha kuru ghaṭaṃ kāryam 
anena kariṣyāmi_iti / na tadvac chabdān prayokṣyamāṇo vaiyākaraṇa-kulaṃ 
gatvā_āha kuru śabdān prayokṣya iti / tāvaty eva_artham artham upādāya śabdān 
prayuñjate //  (M Paspaśā, vol. I, 7–8) 
But how does one know that the relation between the word and its referent is 
established? On account of the current [usage] (lokataḥ).31 Because in the current 
[usage] (loke), [people] use words the meaning/object of which is already known, 
they do not make an effort to create [them]. On the other hand, in the case of 
created things, they make an effort to create [them]. For example, one who needs 
a pot for some purpose, goes to the house of a potter and says: “You make a pot. I 
need a pot for some purpose”. [But] one who wants to use words does not go to 
the house of a grammarian and say: “You make words. I want to use them”. He 
just uses words the meaning/object of which is already known (i.e. words are al-
ready there, ready for use). 
— The same kind of usage is observed for the adjective laukika (“mundane”), 
derived from loka (e.g., M on A 4.1.3, vol. II, 197); 
— as well as for the word prayoga (“usage”), often qualified by laukika 
(e.g., M Paspaśā on V 5, vol. I, p.9 and M on V 19 on A 1.2.64, vol. I, 
p.237). 
                                              
30) See, for example, the regularly mentioned maxim liṅgam aśiṣyaṃ loka-āśrayatvāl liṅgasya 
“Gender is not to be taught because it is based on current usage” (see, among others, M on V 5 
on A 2.1.36). 
31) The point is the following: by giving derivational processes of words, does the grammar create 
the said words? If so, the eternity of words (and of the Vedas) would be beyond question. 
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These three terms do denote a form of subjectivity which is from a differ-
ent level from the one considered up until now: it is a collective subjectivity. 
 
To close this chapter devoted to Kātyāyana and Patañjali, two points may be 
highlighted. First, human subjectivity is sometimes referred to to indicate lan-
guage arbitrariness, either individual (such as word order), or collective (such 
as the word-meaning/object relation).32 The second point concerns the impor-
tance of the authoritativeness of the speaker: in a context where linguistic, reli-
gious and social otherness is becoming stronger and stronger (as it probably 
was by Patañjali’s time), the identification of the norm and of its sharers is 
crucial. After the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali, the glossary of the subjectivity in 
language can be considered as definitely established. Very few new terms will 
appear with the later grammarians. The various examples quoted above show 
that the linguistic levels where this subjectivity — either embodied in the indi-
vidual speaker or in the speakers’ community — intervenes are syntax, mor-
phology, gender and semantics. 
 
 
4. Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari 
Most of the terms we have previously met with are used by Bhartṛhari with the 
same meaning. Few innovations are nevertheless introduced. Some familiar 
notions are used in different contexts or to denote different objects33 and some 
new notions or expressions appear, like:  
1) āpta (“one who has obtained, reached”), which denotes authoritative speakers 
(VP 3.12.7);  
2) viguṇa or aśakta abhidhātṛ (“one who speaks badly or without having any ca-
pacity”), which denotes bad speakers (VP 1.181, 182); 
3) ukti (“uttered”) and viniyoga (“use”), which denote the deliberate use by the 
speaker of a word in a particular meaning (VP 2.403).34  
 
Two other points deserve special attention: the first because of its fundamental 
character and the second because of its frequency. 
 
1) In the A, language was considered from the derivational point of view, 
great attention was therefore paid to the cutting up of language into units and 
                                              
32) The question of gender and number is already mentioned by Pāṇini (cf. A 1.2.53). 
33) 1) ṛṣi (e.g. VP 1.23) and śiṣṭa (e.g. VP 1.29) denote the ancient Sanskrit grammarians (cf. 
Deshpande 1993, 1998); 2) laukika and alaukika respectively denote the concrete reality of 
spoken and understood sentences and the internal reality of mental speech (cf. Biardeau 1964: 
401); 3) vivakṣā (cf. Radicchi 1993) is used in relation to the following topics: the words used 
with their first or second meaning (e.g. VP 2.304), the wish to express oneself (e.g. VP 
1.119), the presentation of something which does not yet exist as an agent (VP 3.7.103), the 
gender (e.g. VP 3.13.19). 
34) See Subramania Iyer (1977: xlv). 
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to their forms. The V and the M, being explicit commentaries of the A, un-
avoidably follow the same approach, even if philosophical aspects are occa-
sionally developed. Bhartṛhari, in his Vākyapadīya — which is not presented as 
a commentary on the A —, intends to cast new light on the Pāṇinian treatise in 
developing its metaphilosophical assumptions. According to him, grammar 
has, as a fundamental principle, a theory of knowledge (jñāna) and his aim is 
to provide a detailed analysis of it. According to ancient Indian scholars, any 
knowledge always implies three elements: 1) the object of knowledge (idam x 
“this x”), 2) the knowledge process (jānāmi “I know”), 3) the knowing subject 
(aham “I”).35 Within the context of language, the object of knowledge is the 
utterance and the knowing subject is the hearer.36 One of the recurrent ques-
tions of the VP then is: how does the hearer obtain knowledge of the sentence 
enunciated by — and previously thought by — the speaker?37 This is an occa-
sion for the use of terms denoting the hearer. The most frequent is pratipattṛ 
(“one who knows, understands”),38 as one finds in the following verse:39 
vaktrā_anyathā_eva prakrānto bhinneṣu pratipattṛṣu /  
svapratyaya-anukāreṇa śabda-arthaḥ pravibhajyate //  (VP 2.135) 
The referent of a word, intended by the speaker in a specific manner, is diversely 
understood by different hearers, according to their own experience. 
                                              
35) The sentence “Here is a pot” (ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ) is traditionally analysed by Indian logicians as 
follows (Foucher 1949: 87): “La démarche suivante, laquelle pour cette raison prend le nom 
d’anuvyavasāyaḥ et correspond à notre “fait de conscience”, consiste à rapporter cette cogni-
tion de la cruche (ghaṭa-jñānam) au moi qui la possède, ce qui se traduit par: ghaṭa-jñānavān 
aham ou plus simplement “ghaṭaṃ jānāmi Je connais la cruche”. Dans une proposition de ce 
genre il faut donc distinguer trois choses: a) un objet (la cruche); b) l’action exercée sur cet 
objet, laquelle s’exprime ici par la racine verbale “jñā connaître”; c) le sujet de cette connais-
sance, représenté par la désinence de la première personne du présent de l’indicatif [...]. Entre 
b et c, comme entre toute Substance (ici l’Âme) et ses Qualités (ici la Connaissance), il y a une 
relation coessentielle (samavāya-saṃbandhaḥ [...]); entre a et b, il ne peut être question d’une 
relation de ce genre [...] il reste que ce soit une “relation d’un genre particulier: svarūpa)” 
déterminée par l’objet de la connaissance (ici par une cruche).” 
36) Cf. Matilal (1985: 417): “When we say that a particular hearer a understands the meaning, we 
mean thereby that a has a particular ‘structured’ thought. It may be said, therefore, that the In-
dian philosophers were concerned with the ‘hearer’s meaning’ rather than the ‘speaker’s 
meaning’.” 
37) An interesting occurrence of the notion of vivakṣā and the freedom it implies is VP 2.432–437.  
38) The term grahītṛ “one who grasps” is used once in VP 1.54, as well as puruṣa “man” in VP 
2.333. Note that verbs of knowledge imply the knowing subject, such as pratīyate in VP 3.3.1, 
3.3.32.  
39) Other interesting occurrences are: VP 1.87, 1.94, 2.17, 2.18, 2.317, 2.319, 2.346, 2.474–475, 
3.3.19, 3.7.114, 3.9.67, 3.14.44, 3.14.77, 3.14.473. 
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2) The second point I would like to highlight, because it occurs rather fre-
quently in the VP, is the role of the speaker when using polysemous words 
(and synonyms), as it appears in the following kārikā:40 
bahuṣv eka-abhidhāneṣu sarveṣv eka-arthakāriṣu /  
yat prayoktā_abhisaṃdhatte śabdas tatra_avatiṣṭhate //  (VP 2.406) 
When several [referents] have one word to express them [and] when all [words] 
cause [the comprehension] of one referent, the word is applied to [the referent] the 
[language] user is aiming at [and the referent is denoted by the word the latter 
wants to use]. 
This idea will be often mentioned by later commentators.41 
 
5. Further innovations 
Two further innovations have to be noticed. 
— First, the use of the word tātparya (“fact of being wholly engaged or occu-
pied in”) as denoting speaker’s intention. As far as I know, the first occur-
rence in the grammatical sphere is in the Kāśikā-vṛtti, the oldest extant com-
plete running commentary on the A (7th cent.). While commenting on the 
Pāṇinian sūtra A 3.2.81 (which is given below), it is said:42  
bahulam ābhīkṣṇye //  (A 3.2.81) 
[The suffix in is used < A 3.2.78] variously [after a verbal root] to express repetition. 
[...] ābhīkṣṇyaṃ paunaḥpunyam / tātparyam āsevā_eva tācchīlyād anyat / [...]   
 (KV on A 3.2.81, vol. II, 511) 
ābhīkṣṇyam [means] constant repetition. What is aimed at (tātparyam) is repeti-
tion, which is different from habitual disposition. 
It is very much later with Nāgeśa, the last great grammarian of the Pāṇinian 
school (17th–18th cent.), that the notion will be fruitfully used in the gramma-
tical discourse, as in the following passage of the Paramalaghumañjūṣā:  
nānā-artha-sthale loke tātparyaṃ tv etat padaṃ vākyaṃ vā_etad-artha-pratyayāya 
mayā_uccāryata iti prayoktur icchā-rūpam / tātparya-niyāmakaṃ ca loke praka-
raṇa-ādikam eva /  (Paramalaghumañjūṣā, 84) 
But in the case of polysemy in the current usage (loke), intention (tātparyaṃ) con-
sists in the wish (icchā) of the [language] user (prayoktur) that such a word or 
sentence uttered by him makes understood such referent. And in the current usage, 
situational context (prakaraṇa), etc. serve to delimit what is intended. 
                                              
40) Cf. Aussant (in prep.). 
41) E.g. P on M on A 1.1.20 (vol. I, 298). 
42) The two other occurrences of tātparya in the KV are on A 3.4.56 and 7.2.59, rules which con-
cern verbal morphology. 
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Nāgeśa’s use of the word is probably more influenced by the logicians’ use 
than due to mere scholastic heritage. One has to recall that ancient Indian logi-
cians mainly dealt with means of arriving at correct knowledge (pramāṇa), and 
speech (śabda), as conceived as the statement of a trustworthy person, is one 
of these. Within this framework, factors helping in the understanding of the 
meaning of a sentence, such as saṃnidhi (phonetic contiguity), yogyatā (logical 
consistency), ākāṅkṣā (syntactic expectency) and tātparya (speaker’s intention) 
received special attention.43 The use of tātparya within the context of Indian 
logic would deserve a study entirely devoted to it, which is beyond my scope 
here. 
 
— The second innovation consists in the use of some of the previously men-
tioned terms, mainly prayoga and vivakṣā,44 to legitimize new linguistic forms 
which can hardly be conciliated with Pāṇinian sūtras.45 For example, the Dur-
ghaṭa-vṛtti of Śaranadeva, a 12th cent. commentary on the A,46 takes up about 
five hundred rules together with particular forms, and proposes interpretations 
whereby the rules account for the forms.47 The speaker’s intention criterion is 
used here as a grammatical device which makes wider — and then more 
approximate — the scope of Pāṇinian sūtras.48  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Indian grammarians of Sanskrit in fact paid very close attention to human sub-
jectivity in language; they clearly perceived its omnipresence, the speaking 
subject being involved in all of his linguistic choices (phonetic, morphological, 
syntactical, semantic). In the Aṣṭādhyāyī, the speaking subjectivity manifests 
itself through the existence of options or choices within the derivations. In the 
                                              
43) Cf. Kunjunni Raja (1963: 149–187). 
44) But also bahulam. 
45) Pāṇini already had recourse to a process enabling a linguistic form conflicting with a sūtra to 
be accepted. This process consists in introducing the linguistic form as a nipātana (literally 
“one which is put down”). Cf. Nāgeśa’s Paribhāṣā (110): bādhakāny eva nipātanāni “[Lin-
guistic forms which] are put down, [though conflicting with a sūtra] just suspend [the said 
sūtra].” 
46) George Cardona (1976: 284), quoting Gaṇapati Sastri, recalls the purpose of the work: “‘[...] 
it is an exposition (vṛtti) reconciling those Lakshyas (forms of words) and Pāṇini’s Sūtras 
which appear difficult to reconcile (durghaṭa) with each other.’” Śaranadeva takes up about 500 
rules, together with particular forms, and proposes interpretations whereby the rules account 
for the forms.” 
47) Occurrences of special interest are: DV on A 1.3.36, 1.3.40, 2.2.8, 2.4.62, 3.1.26, 3.3.139, 
6.3.25. 
48) This device will take the form of a metarule (paribhāṣā) in the Cāndravyākaraṇa (a 5th cent. 
Sanskrit grammar for Buddhists): vivakṣā-vyāpter iṣṭa-avasāyaḥ “the desired [i.e. correct lin-
guistic forms] depends on what one wants to express.” 
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Vārttikas and the Mahābhāṣya, the idea of choice is still there, but human 
subjectivity also begins to become the sign of unpredictability in the — indi-
vidual or collective — use of language. In late commentaries, the intention to 
speak will be a well-known grammatical device introducing new linguistic 
forms. The language user is undeniably present in the grammatical discourse 
of the Mahābhāṣya, but the majority of terms denoting him as such concern his 
authoritativeness regarding speech. This tendency hardens in the Vākyapadīya. 
But it is also Bhartṛhari who first brings the hearer into existence, as a know-
ing subject. A last point. As far as I know, speech was never considered by 
ancient Indian grammarians from a dialogical perspective.49 The ordinary do-
main of what we call the token-reflexivity (semantic functioning of personal 
pronouns, demonstratives and time indices) was a matter of no interest to them 
(with the exception of: 1) the notions of paro’kṣa “invisible” and pratyakṣa 
“visible”,50 2) prakaraṇa “situational context”, mainly referred to in cases of 
ambiguity51 and 3) ūha “modification”, which denotes the linguistic adaptation 
of a hymn or of a prayer to a ritual different from the original one; each of 
these notions deserves a study which cannot be carried out here). This is sur-
prising, when one thinks about the importance of orality in India, all through 
its history. But the orality, in brahmanical India, is restricted to texts recitation 
and to standard discourses or intercourses (scholarship, literature, education, 
politics). It is not, therefore, the oral language of spontaneous daily inter-
courses: the speaking subject is only a spokesman who conveys an eternal truth. 
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49) However, dialogical situations are absent neither from Vedic texts (cf. Jamison 2007: 45 et al.) 
nor from the grammatical discourse itself; but they never constitute the aim of the study as such. 
50) These terms, which imply a fixed point (i.e. the speaker), are used in relation to the verbal 
expression of time (see V and M on A 3.2.115 and 119) as well as in relation to demonstrative 
pronouns (cf. Speijer 1886: 202–205). 
51) Mentioned by Patañjali (e.g. M on V 4 on A 1.1.23), Bhartṛhari (e.g. VP 2.314–315, 317), 
Nāgeśa (Paramalaghumañjūṣā, end of the Śaktivicāra, 51) and poeticians (cf. Kunjunni Raja 
1963: 50). 
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Abbrevations 
 
A Aṣṭādhyāyī 
DV Durgaṭavṛtti 
KV Kāśikāvṛtti 
M Mahābhāṣya 
P Pradīpa 
VP Vākyapadīya 
V Vārttika 
 
 
 
List of authors mentioned and Sanskrit texts 
 
Author Date Work 
Pāṇini 5th–4th cent. 
B.C.? 
Aṣṭādhyāyī (“The Eight Chapters”)  
Grammatical treatise providing the generation of correct 
Sanskrit forms; basic text of the Pāṇinian school, com-
posed in sūtras (“aphorisms”) 
Kātyāyana 3rd cent. B.C. Vārttika (“Remarks on the Procedure”)  
Commentary on a part of Pāṇinian’s sūtras 
Patañjali 2nd cent. B.C. Mahābhāṣya (“The Great Commentary”)  
Commentary on Kātyāyana’s Vārttikas 
Bhartṛhari 5th cent. A.D. Vākyapadīya (“The Work Dealing with Sentences and 
Words”)  
Treatise on philosophy of grammar  
Candra 5th cent. A.D. Cāndravyākaraṇa (“Candra’s Grammar”)  
Sanskrit grammar for Buddhists 
Jayāditya-Vāmana 7th cent. A.D. Kāśikāvṛtti (“Benares’ Gloss”)  
Extant complete running commentary on Pāṇinian’s sūtras 
Kaiyaṭa 11th cent. A.D. Pradīpa (“The Lamp [of the Great Commentary]”)  
Complete commentary on Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya 
Śaraṇadeva 12th cent. A.D. Durghaṭavṛtti (“The Gloss [on Words] Hard to Form”)  
Commentary on a part of Pāṇinian’s sūtras 
Nāgeśa 17th–18th cent. 
A.D. 
Paramalaghumañjūṣā (“The Very Light Basket”)  
Work on semantics and philosophy of grammar 
Paribhāṣenduśekhara (“Paribhāṣās’ Moon-Crested”)  
Commentary on the Pāṇinian collection of metarules 
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